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Recent Developments

Jackson v. State:
Judge's Expansion Beyone the Outer Limits of His or Her Broad Discretionary
Rights Equates to Impermissible Error
By Julie Folkemer Zimmer

The Court of Appeals of Maryland
held that a judge's conmlents about a
defendant's place of origin during the
sentencing process amounted to
impermissible sentencing criteria.
Jackson v. State, 354 Md. 192,772
A.2d273 (2001). In so holding, the
court determined that the judge had
erroneously considered the defendant's
origin in fom1Ulating the sentence. The
court noted that ajudge may be granted
broad discretion, however the origin of
a defendant is clearly an inappropriate
factor and creates an inference ofa lack
of impartiality. Id. at 208.
On July 12, 1998, at 1:00 a.m., the
Defendant, Valentino Maurice Jackson
("Jackson"), went to the home of the
ViCtinl, Mitchell Woods ("Woods'), to
buy cocaine, but Woods refused to sell
itto him. On July 12,1998 at3:30 a.m.
Jackson returned to Woods'home and
was observed by a patrol officer ainling
a short-barreled shotgun at Woods'
chest. Jackson was then arrested and
convicted in the Circuit Court for
Howard County of first-degree assault,
second-degree assault, reckless
endangemlent, and unlawful possession
of a short-barreled shotgun. During
sentencing, the trial judge imposed an
18 year sentence, and made the
following statements:
Now, unfortunately, a
number of communities in
the lovely city of Columbia

have attracted a large
number of rotten apples.
Unfortunately, most ofthem
came from the city. And
they live and act like they're
living in a ghetto
somewhere. And they
weren't invited out here to
behave like animals .... That
is why people move out
here to get away :from
people like Mr. Jackson.
Not to associate with them
and have them follow them
out here and act like this
was a jungle of some kind.
So. It's not. And our only
chances to preserve it is to
protect it.
Id. at198.

In an unreported opinion, the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland
affirnled in part, reversed in part, and
vacated the sentences for reckless
endangerment and second-degree
assault." Id. at 198. The Court of
Appeals ofMaryland granted certiorari
to determine whether the judge's
comments at sentencing exceeded the
outer limit ofthe judge's broad discretion
in sentencing and ifso, did it amount to
impermissible sentencing criteria.
Jackson, 354 Md. at 199,772 A.2d
273. The court noted that not only
should a judge be impartial and

disinterested, but also that "the judge
has the appearance ofbeing impartial
and disinterested". Id. at 207. The
court concluded that the sentencing
judge "at least in part, [acted] on the
improper presumption that petitioner
was from Baltimore City," in essence
considering the defendant's origin in
deciding the sentence. Id. at 208.
Therefore, the court ofappeals held the
judge's comments at sentencing
exceeded the outer limit ofthe judge's
broad discretion and was impennissible
sentencing criteria. Id. at 207.
The court of appeals began its
analysis by referring to prior case law
granting a judge very broad discretion
in sentencing criminal defendants. Id.
at 199. The court identified the
applicable grounds for appellate review
of a trial courts sentence. The court
detemlined that one appealable issue
is when the sentencing judge is "
motivated by ill-will, prejudice, or other
impermissible considerations." Id. at
200. The Jackson court concluded
that the comments made by the trial
court constituted review under this
theory. Id. at 200.
Next, the court compared the facts
in Jackson to those in United States
v: Diamond, 561 F.2d 557 (401 Cir.
1977), in which the court identified
inlpernrissible considerations made by
thejudge during the sentencing hearing.
In Diamond, two defendants from
New York were convicted in Virginia
32.1 U. BaIt. L.F. 45
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of theft of an interstate shipment of
goods. During sentencing, the judge
said, "I suppose that you have a
constitutional rightto commit a crime
wherever you want to commit it. But
the Court takes a dim view of people
coming down from New York to
conmrit their crimes in Vrrginia " Id. at
200 (quoting United States v.
Diamond, 561 F. 2d557, 559 (4ll1 Cir.
1977). In Diamond, the court

concluded there was no bias during the
trial, but that the comments at sentencing
reflected bias. The determination made
by the court that the defendants had
received a fair and just trial led them to
affiml the conviction, while reversing the
sentence due to the evidence of bias
during the sentencing hearing. In
comparison, in Jackson, during
sentencing the judge "gave the
impression that he based his sentence,
at least in part, on something beyond
the facts and circumstances ofthe crime
and the background of petitioner." Id.
at 20 1. Even though Jackson was not
from Baltimore City, thejudge may have
factored in the defendant's origin as a
criteria during the sentence. The court
in Diamond concluded that a
defendant's origin is irrelevant to and
must not be considered in sentencing.
In application of the holding in
Diamond, and the statements made by
the judge in Jackson, the court
detemlined that while the judge has
some degree of judicial discretion, a
limitation imposed on a judge prevents
the judge from using the defendants
origin as a sentencing criteria.
The court also explored the idea that
the judge's comments may have been
racially biased. The court believed that
the comments made by the judge did

32.1 U. BaIt L.F. 46

not reflect actual racial prejudice,
however the court cautioned that they
could lead areasonable person to draw
such an inference that the sentence was
racially motivated Id. at 202. Thecourt
of appeals in Contee v. State, 223 Md.
575, 165 A.2d 889 (1960), examined
the theory ofimproper appeals to racial
prejudice. In Contee, an African
American man was tried for rape of a
Caucasian woman. In Contee, the
prosecutor continually emphasized the
distinction in race between the victim
and the defendant. Id. at 203. The
court ofappeals reasoned that while the
racial comments in Conlee were blatant,
1heracially biased result remained swar
to that in Jackson, 364 Md. at 207.
The court in Jackson relied on Con tee
to uphold that the "matters ofrace and
the matters of a defendant's place of
residence or origin are inappropriate
sentencing considerations," even when
here is an absence of racial prejudice.
Id. at 202.
The court of appeals analyzed prior
case law to clarify the distinction
between pennissible and impennissible
judicial remarks. The court applied the
ruling in Poe v. State, 341 Md. 523,
671 A.2d 501 (1996), in which a
judge's comments concerning his
religious andphilosophical beliefs didnot
infer that the sentence was motivated
by ill will. Thejudge in Poe stated, ''what
irritated [him] was this liberal philosophy
.... I still believe in old fashion law ....
Maybe one day1hey will say you should
not sit here any more because you are
too much of a dinosaur. You are too
conservativeincriminallaw." Id. at206.
(quoting Poe v. State, 341 Md. 523,
671 A.2d 501 (1996)). The court in
Poe deternlined a judge could make

remarks., such as those stated above,
as long as the sentence and the
sentencing factors were not motivated
by ill will, prejudice, origin or other
impernrissible consideration. Id. at 206.
The court distinguished the remarks in
Jackson from 1hose inPoe by illustrating
that the statements in Poe concerned
the judge's personal beliefs and were
not directed at any particular person. Id.
at 207. Conversely, the remarks in
Jackson were directed at the defendant
andreflectedhow1hejudgeviewedhim
personally. The court concluded that
judicial comment should only retlecthow
the law views the defendant's conduct,
not how the judge views the defendants
conduct.
The holding by the Court of Appeals
of Maryland in Jackson v. State
redefines the discretionary powers
granted to trial judges. The court in
Jackson, while lirnitingthe discretionary
authority, also reaffinns the fundanlental
right offairness and the extension ofthat
righttothesentencingphase. Id. at207.
The holding affirms Maryland's
distinction in limiting the discretionary
powers ofthe trial judge, and reasserts
the right to equal treatment regardless
of race, origin, or religion. Jackson
verifies the practitioner's ability to appeal
a sentence when a trial judge has
stepped beyond the discretionary
powers conferred upon the office, and
factored a defendant's race, religion or
origin into 1he sentencing guidelines.

